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A NEW, EMERGING WORLD ORDER:
REFLECTIONS OF TRADITION AND PROGRESSION
THROUGH THE EYES OF TWO COURTS
I. INTRODUCrION
Our modem world is united. Since October 24, 1945, more than 170
nations of the world have united as members of an international Charter and its
underlying organization, the United Nations. This Charter's primary objective,
and that of the organization, is to save generations from the "scourge of war" by
maintaining international peace and promoting a recognition of the fundamental
rights of humankind.' In pursuit of this objective, the organization, through its
Charter, has sought to change the perspective of the State from that of a self-
serving and isolated entity to that of a smaller unit within a much larger world
community. While this has "united" the nations of the world to some extent, it
has gone further and altered the traditional perspective of State sovereignty by
imposing international obligations and responsibilities upon the State, which
make it answerable for its actions to the community-at-large.
The United Nations Charter serves as codification of fundamental law for
the international community, and as such it embraces many functions. First
among them, founding Member States intended that an organization of united
nations strive to establish conditions under which justice and respect for
obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law could be
maintained.2 This particular charge has required Member States to place
increased importance upon the harmonious observance and exercise of
international law to ensure cooperation and respect between states are preserved.
However, in the process of promoting international peace, requiring proper
deference to international obligations, and furthering the purposes of the
organization's goals, this charge has also altered the notion of sovereignty to
1. U.N. CHARTER pmbl. [hereinafter CHARTER].
2. Id. 3. See also id. art. 2(4) which calls upon States to refrain from the threat of force or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State. This article demonstrates the
acknowledgment of international respect throughout the State system.
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which States have always been accustomed and brought about increased
international responsibility.
This comment identifies the growing recognition of international responsibil-
ity of the State throughout the world, focusing specifically on the reactions of
two world leaders, the United States and the United Kingdom. It discusses a
particular instance in which the highest courts of both States, relying upon their
own domestic precedents and giving some credence to international persuasion
from court and custom, ruled in an opposite manner on the issue of forced
international extradition. It compares these decisions as exemplary of a struggle
arising between the traditional concept of the "sovereign State" and the emerging
idea of a "new world order" - a concept embodied in the Charter which
sacrifices some State sovereignty for the greater good. The comment concludes
with a discussion of the implications the two decisions may have upon the world
community in light of its current advancement and evolution.
I. THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND EXTRADITION
A. The Sovereignty of States
The notion of the sovereign State was conceived long ago. From the
collapse of the Roman Empire to the present time, two distinct characteristics
have stood out in a State's makeup: (1) States create geographic boundaries into
which they gather populations; and (2) States select a form of government to
serve those populations as needed.3
Sovereign States also maintain the prerogative and objective of being "free
to order their own affairs, internally and externally, and they are not subordinate
to any other political authority."4 Accordingly, this notion yields the State wide
latitude in its ability to both independently create and enforce laws which govern
the relationships within its population.5 To exercise this power, it is only logical
that each State is therefore free to embrace the form of government of its choice
and implement its chosen social, legal, and economic structure or philosophy.6
Another important interest to the sovereign State is the control and
protection of its citizens. The State to which an individual belongs enjoys a
certain degree of control over that person.7 This control may take the form of
certain public duties and obligations placed upon the citizen, but such duties and
obligations do not cross national boundary lines. The individual is likewise
afforded certain privileges and immunities which also do not cross boundaries
and are not afforded to citizens of other States.' It is thus implicit in the
3. Cf the four "qualifications" afforded to States as noted in art. 1 of the Convention on Rights and
Duties, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097.
4. FREDERICK S. DUNN, THE PROTECTION OF NATIONALS - A STUDY IN THE APPLICATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 27 (1970).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. For related readings see GEOFFREY DE Q. WALKER, THE RULE OF LAW (1988).
8. DUNN, supra note 4, at 27-28.
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makeup of a State that its government possess no power to control the citizens
of another State, and that its populations do not reap benefits provided by
another State without changing citizenship. In essence, States enjoy the right to
be responsible for those populations existing within their geographic boundaries
and to confer upon them privileges and rights not available to citizens of other
States.
Sovereign States also -possess the ability to create agreements between
themselves and other States. Obviously, the fact that States must interact and,
to some extent, need to act in harmony compels the use of international pacting.
These agreements usually relate to commerce and industry, but they may extend
to areas such as personal jurisdiction, e.g., one State's ability to assert control
over certain citizens of the other. This concept. has been recognized as a
common tool facilitating State concerns throughout the world; it is known as
extradition.9
Extradition treaties confer upon the contracting States a greater degree of
control over certain citizens of the States with which they contract. They set
forth particular guidelines by which a transfer of nationals may occur, thus
putting into place a means by which a State may lawfully, and with respect for
the sovereignty of the other, exercise jurisdiction over a particular national of the
other State. It has been the unfortunate practice of States however, to act under
preconceived notions of sovereignty to evade existing extradition treaties under
which foreign nationals could have been properly extradited.
M. Cherif Bassiouni0 recognized three basic techniques States employ
which essentially serve to "dodge" the extradition process. They are:
(1) abduction and kidnapping of a person by the agents of another state;
(2) informal surrender of a person by the agents of one state to another without
formal or legal process;
(3) use of immigration laws as a device to directly or indirectly surrender a person
or place a person in a position where he or she can be taken into custody by the
agents of another state.I
It is the first technique which has tremendous international implications and,
above the others, is considered violative of recognized principles of international
law. It is also the first technique which is the subject of this Comment, and a
proper question at this point would be: what is the status of international law
regarding forced extradition?
9. Extradition is the act of surrendering alleged criminals to another country. This concept is generally
found within provisions of international treaties. States may act without following treaties and rely on their
own laws, morals or principles, but extradition remains the basis for rendering an accused to the courts of
another nation, and the basis for extradition is founded within treaties. SATYA DEVA BFDt, EXTRADrroN IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 15 (1968) (citing E. VATrEL., THE LAW OF NATIONS; OR PRINCIPLES OF
NATURAL LAW 3, 19 (J.B. Scott trans., 1916)). In the absence of a treaty, a State must rely upon its own
extradition laws and those of a requesting country.
10. Bassiouni, LL.B., J.D., LL.M., J.S.D., is a professor of law at DePaul University.
11. M. CHERIF BASsiOUN1, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADrrON AND WORLD PUB11C ORDER 122-23 (1974).
1994]
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B. The Concept of International Law and Extradition
Though hard to determine and not easily applied, "international law" in its
broadest sense consists of "rules and principles of general application dealing
with the conduct of States and of international organizations and with their
relations inter se, as well as with some of their relations with persons, whether
natural or juridical."' 2  This includes law contained in widely accepted
multilateral agreements as well as that observed in the practice of particular
States. 3 A rule of international law is a principle accepted as "law" by the
international community of States when evidenced by: (a) particular customs,
(b) international agreements, or (c) extraction of certain "general principles"
common to the major legal systems of the world.14 In determining whether a
rule has become international law, one must give deference to the judgments and
opinions of national or international tribunals, writings of scholars, and
pronouncements of States that undertake to formulate rules of international law,
when such pronouncements are not seriously challenged.' 5
Forced extradition and kidnapping under color of law have been considered
violations of State sovereignty and territorial integrity.'6  These actions
allegedly permit a State to exercise judiciary power over a fugitive offender
brought before it by any means, regardless of the legality of those means. 7
Absent governmental action which directly violates or circumvents a treaty,
forced extradition and kidnapping also deny the kidnapped person any basis upon
which to challenge jurisdiction of the prosecuting forum.' 8 According to
Bassiouni, these actions create very distinct violations of international principles,
including: "(a) disruption of world public order, (b) infringement on the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of another state, and (c) violation of the
human rights of the individual unlawfully seized."' 9 Therefore, this method by
which one State receives a benefit through the invasion of another's sovereignty
generally detracts from any concept of order the Charter or the United Nations
sought to establish.
Forced extradition and kidnapping have been held to violate the Charters of
the United Nations and the Organization of American States. According to the
Second Circuit in United States v. Toscanino,20 the abduction of a man from
Uruguay for prosecution in the United States directly violated Article 2(4) of the
Charter of the United Nations and Article 17 of that of the Organization of
American States.2' The Second Circuit came to its conclusion based upon a
12. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §101 (1986).
13. Id. at cmt. d.
14. Id. §102. See also art. 38(1) of the Stat. of the I.C.J., 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No.993 (Oct. 24, 1945).
15. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law §103 (1986).
16. BASSIOUNI, supra note 11, at 124.
17. CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY, TERRORISM, DRUGS, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN LIBERTY 276-77 (1992).
18. Id. at 277.
19. BASSIOUNI, supra note 11. at 124.
20. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 277 (2d Cir.), reh'g denied en banc, 504 F.2d 1380 (1974).
21. CHARTER, supra note 1, art. 2, 1 4; O.A.S. CHARTER art. 17. Both paragraphs require all members
to refrain from threat or use of force against the "territorial integrity" or "political independence" of another
[Vol. 2:143
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Security Council resolution addressed to the international kidnapping of Adolf
Eichmann from Argentina by Israeli volunteers several years earlier.2
In the Eichmann situation, the State of Argentina complained to the Security
Council of Israel's acts under Article 35 of the U.N. Charter.' The Security
Council subsequently adopted a resolution24 criticizing such abduction, though
it was intended to bring Eichmann to Israel for prosecution of crimes he
committed during the Second World War.' Specifically, the Security Council
stated:
Considering that the violation of the sovereignty of a Member State is incompatible
with the Charter of the United Nations... [and n]oting that the repetition of acts
such as that giving rise to this situation would involve a breach of the principles
upon which international order is founded creating an atmosphere of insecurity and
distrust incompatible with the preservation of peace ... [the Security Council
requests] the Government of Israel to make appropriate reparation in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations and the rules of international law. 6
The Second Circuit interpreted this resolution to show the Security Council's
recognition of a "long standing principle of international law" that one State's
abduction of persons from within the territory of another violates the latter
State's territorial sovereignty and calls for repatriation of the abducted person. 7
Since the resolution survived a United States or United Kingdom veto, the
28Second Circuit, as have other authorities, viewed the resolution as a reflection
of international law.
The Toscanino court found that the United States had voted against Israel
in the resolution and held it to that concurring vote, which the court believed
confirmed the United States' acceptance of the legal principle that transnational
abduction violates international law. It then concluded that the United States'
actions could not be tolerated. Though the case never reached the Supreme
Court, the court's finding directly challenged the United States' long-standing
law on the subject. It also served as a cornerstone for other cases, including
United States ex rel. Lujdn v. Gengler,29 which modified Toscanino to allow
such a conclusion only where the conduct (abduction) was "of the most
egregious and reprehensible kind,, 30 i.e., abduction coincident with serious in-
fliction of injury.
state. See also O.A.S. CHARTER arts. 18-20 regarding improper state intervention and territorial inviolability.
22. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 277.
23. Article 35(1) allows Member States to bring disputes or situations falling under article 34 to the
attention of the Security Council or the General Assembly. Article 34 provides the Security Council discretion
to investigate disputes or situations that "might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute," to
determine whether they will likely endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.
24. U.N. Doc. S/4349 (1960).
25. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 277.
26. Michael J. Glennon, International Kidnapping: State-Sponsored Abduction: A Comment on United
States v. Alvarez-Machain, 86 AM. J. INT'L. L. 746, 746-47 n.8 (1992) (citing U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/4349).
27. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 278.
28. See Glennon, supra note 26 (discussing the United States' actions with Alvarez-Machain as compared
to historically conflicting decisions and authority).
29. United States ex rel. Lujin v. engler, 510 F.2d 62, 63 (2d Cir. 1975).
30. BLAKEsLEY, supra note 17, at 277, n.483 (citing Lujfn, 510 F.2d at 62).
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From the practice, writings and decisions of the international community,
it is clear that forced extradition has not been traditionally favored. As stated
above, the act has been considered violative of fundamental human rights and
also of the territorial integrity of the country wherein the abduction occurred.
Though these actions appear to be a convenient method by which a State may
obtain in personam jurisdiction over a person outside its boundaries, they, are
clearly not accepted by the international community and even seen as proscribed
under the U.N. and O.A.S. Charters. For many years however, States such as
the United States and the United Kingdom have exercised this extension of their
sovereignty without fail.
Nineteenth century law in the United States and the United Kingdom set
forth the principle that a State need not inquire into the means by which a
criminal defendant is brought before its court, provided international agreements
are not breached. As early as 1829, in Ex Parte Susannah Scott,3 ' the United
Kingdom announced law that prevented the court from considering how a person
was brought within its jurisdiction in criminal matters.32 Likewise in 1886, in
the cases of Ker v. Illinois33 and United States v. Rauscher,4 the United States
Supreme Court took a similar stance, holding that when the language of a treaty
does not prohibit abduction and is not referred to in the procurement of the act,
the treaty is not violated and the accused must stand trial.35
These viewpoints are consistent with the traditional concept of the power
of the sovereign State, wherein State action need only serve the State's direct
interests regardless of any effects or counter-effects its action might have in the
international community. Furthermore, this State action may be accomplished
by whatever means necessary to achieve the State's ultimate purpose. Whether
international law is violated in the meantime is not a relevant question. These
viewpoints allow the State wide discretion to conduct its own affairs without
deference to the interests of the international community.
The U.N. Charter and its parent organization are new creatures to the
nations of the world because they place a heightened value upon international
relationships,, and they require all nations to give proper respect and consider-
ation for each other in the carrying out oftheir own domestic policies. This
concept reflects an underlying goal of the Charter which seeks to preserve
inviolate the treaties invoked between nations, because they reflect such
international respect and cooperation. Since these international instruments form
the basis for interpreting relationships between nations, one must first consider,
within the scope of this Comment, the treaties in question in order to reasonably
assess an alleged treaty violation and that of international law.
31. Id. at 126 (citing Ex Parte Susannah Scott 9 B & C 446 (1929)).
32. R. v. Horseferry Road Magistrates' Court, ex parte Bennett [19931 3 All E.R. 138, 145 (citing Ex
Parte Susannah Scott).
33. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
34. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
35. Ker, 119 U.S. at 442-44. Note also that the Ker court referred to the Ex Parte Susannah Scott (cited




C. The U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty
At the center of the suit in United States v. Alvarez-Machain36 was the
Extradition Treaty between the United States and Mexico. This Treaty,
entered into force January 25, 1980,3" defines all extraditable offenses and
procedures which govern extradition between the two nations. Under the
Preamble of the Treaty, both the United States and the United Mexican States
noted their ultimate reason for entering the pact: "[C]lose cooperation in the
fight against crime and mutually rendered assistance in matters of extradition. 39
This Treaty was created to govern situations where nationals of one State commit
criminal acts against those of the other; the language of the instrument evinces
its importance to both governments of the United States and Mexico.
Article 2 and the Appendix of the Treaty list offenses which merit
extradition. They include murder or manslaughter, malicious wounding or
injury, kidnapping, abduction and assault among others.' All willful acts not
included in the Treaty's Appendix also constitute extraditable offenses if they are
punishable under the federal law of either State." Additionally, extradition is
a remedy under Article 2(4) of the Treaty, for any act committed in attempting,
conspiring, or participating in the offense. Thus, an "extraditable offense" under
the Treaty encompasses a broad range of activities from the planning stage to
perpetration.
Article 10 of the Treaty enumerates the procedure by which one State may
request extradition and explicitly requires that such requests be made through
"diplomatic channels."'42 Word selection here is critical, because this provision
not only specifies that upper level officials are required to request, consider and
grant extraditions, but it also illuminates the importance of the process to both
States.43 Such procedural formality can only imply a certain respect for and
consideration of the sovereignty of each State and that of each State's legal
processes as well.
Whether the State from which extradition is requested is bound to deliver
an alleged offender is a question of the State's executory power and discretion.
Under the Article 9 of the Treaty, neither State is bound to deliver any national,
and the ultimate decision is made by "executive" authority and discretion."
Article 9(2) also provides an escape mechanism for one State to refuse
extradition by requiring submission of the case to competent authorities within
36. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S.Ct. 2188 (1992).
37. Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., 31 U.S.T. 5059.
38. Id.
39. Id at 5061.
40. Id at 5076. For a complete listing of all other extraditable offenses, see the Appendix, 31 U.S.T.
at 5076-77.
41. Id. at 5062.
42. Id at 5066.
43. See id art. 10, 2 for further formality in setting forth the procedural guidelines to request and
consider extradition. For further requirements concerning the extradition process, see id. art. 10, It 3, 4, 5 and
6; arts. 11-17.
44. Id. at 5065.
1994]
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its territory for prosecution.45 The formality of this procedure further demon-
strates respect for the sovereign control each State maintains over its own
nationals. To violate these principles or require automatic extraditions without
governmental decision making would deprive the State of its sovereign discretion
and create an erratic system in which two nations could seek "justice" at the
expense of their nationals' rights and their territorial integrity.
The Treaty between Mexico and the United States seeks to maintain the
integrity of the judicial and executive functions of both nations simultaneously.
It also attempts to allow for proper prosecution without depriving the accused of
certain fundamental rights. In sum, it attempts to maintain a certain balance
between the apparent necessity of criminal prosecution presented by the
requesting State and the sovereignty and self-governance of the State from which
extradition is requested. This balance is vital to both States because international
relations between the two depend in part upon the relationship established by this
Treaty. If either State ignores its obligations under this document, harmonious
relations established between them could be jeopardized.
The Court was faced with a complex issue directly involving the Extradition
Treaty in Alvarez' case. He claimed the United States violated the Treaty by
bringing him by force from Mexico to trial before a United States District Court.
Alvarez claimed this action violated Article 22(1) of the Treaty 46 and was cause
for dismissal of the action.
D. The U.K. Extradition Act of 1989
In the periphery of the suit in R. v. Horseferry Road Magistrates' Court, ex
parte Bennett,47 was the Extradition Act of 1989.48 This Act consolidated all
English enactments relating to extradition prior to September 27 of that same
year.49 It also set forth all extraditable offenses and procedures for extradition
and generally regulated the judicially reasoned movement of persons into and out
of the country. It governed all situations in which foreign nationals committed
criminal acts against the United Kingdom and vice versa. Section 2 of the Act
contains a list of extraditable offenses which includes any offense punishable in
England by imprisonment for over one year.50
For purposes of prosecution, it was intended that an "extraditable offense"
would encompass a wide range of activities. Sections 7 through 9 of the Act
cover the procedures for requesting extradition and enumerate precise steps by
which a nation or the United Kingdom may seek such action. Section 9
explicitly provides the court jurisdiction and describes the proper committal
proceedings of those arrested under warrant. This procedure, like the U.S.-
Mexico Treaty, depends heavily on formal processes, which reflects the United
45. Id.
46. Id. at 5073-74. Art. 22, 1 deals primarily with the scope of the Treaty and essentially refers to
those offenses listed in art. 2, which are discussed supra at 5062-63.
47. R. v. Horseferry Road Magistrates' Court, ex parte Bennett [1993] 2 All E.R. 474.
48. Extradition Act, 1989 (Eng.).
49. Id.
50. Id. § 2.
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Kingdom's intent to maintain respect for the sovereignty of other States and
allow due consideration for the ability and the correctness of foreign process.
The House of Lords did not directly examine the Extradition Act in Ex
parte Bennett. Rather, it examined the court's power to look into the means by
which a defendant is forcibly brought before it. Bennett had been charged with
purchasing a helicopter under false pretenses and subsequently defaulting on the
repayment." As a criminal offense in the United Kingdom, this entitled the
government to utilize the Extradition Act against him. Because it failed to do
so, Bennett raised as a defense to the court's jurisdiction, that he was brought
before the court improperly and not under the guise of Section 9 of the Act,
which was cause for his dismissal. Though the Extradition Act was deemed
important, it remained on the case's periphery as the Lords examined a novel
issue of law.
III. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISION
A. Statement of Facts
E nrique Camarena-Salazar (Camarena) was a special agent of the United
States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) in Guadalajara, Mexico. Camarena and
his Mexican pilot, Alfredo Zavala-Avelar, were abducted outside the United
States Consulate in Guadalajara, tortured and later found murdered. A Mexican
national, Ren6 Martin Verdugo-Urquidez (Verdugo), suspected by the DEA to
be a leader of a violent Mexican narco-smuggling group, was believed to be
directly involved in the kidnapping and torture-murders. The DEA obtained a
warrant for Verdugo's arrest in August 1985, and Mexican officials subsequently
arrested him and extradited him to the United States for criminal prosecution
before a federal court, where he was later convicted. 2
Another Mexican national, Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain (Alvarez) was
also believed to be a part of the crimes against Camarena and his pilot. The
DEA believed Alvarez assisted Verdugo in the torture-murders by helping to pro-
long Camarena's life, which allowed him to be further tortured and interrogated.
On April 2, 1990, Alvarez was abducted by United States' officials in
Guadalajara and flown against his will to El Paso, Texas where he was arrested
upon arrival.53 He was later brought before a federal court for trial.
B. Statement of the Case
. The United States charged Alvarez with certain indictments under Title 18
of the United States Code, including the kidnapping of a federal agent and felony
51. Exparte Bennett [1993] 3 All E.R. at 141.
52. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990), for an opinion of the Court as to
Verdugo's subsequent claims against United States agents for violation of Fourth Amendment rights.
53. It was later determined by the District Court that DEA agents were responsible for Alvarez's
kidnapping, though the agents were not personally involved. For specific findings of the District Court in
related proceedings see United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 603-04 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
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murder.' Alvarez moved to dismiss the indictments asserting two main points.
First, he alleged the "outrageous governmental conduct" by the United States to
bring about his prosecution was cause to dismiss. Secondly, he asserted that the
District Court lacked jurisdiction to hear his case because the abduction violated
the Extradition Treaty existing between the United States and Mexico.55 The
District Court overruled the outrageous conduct charge but sustained the motion
to dismiss on the grounds it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case since the United
States did violate the Extradition Treaty by abducting Alvarez. The District
Court then ordered Alvarez to be repatriated to Mexico.56
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit, relying in large part on its recent decision in
Verdugo-Urquidez,57 affirmed the dismissal and held that "the forcible
abduction of the Mexican national [Alvarez] with the authorization or participa-
tion of the United States violated the Extradition Treaty between the United
States and Mexico."5" The court further held that this violation, coupled with
Mexico's official protest,59 provided Alvarez with the "properly-intended"
remedy of dismissal of the action and repatriation to Mexico.'c The United
States Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari, reversed the judgment of
the Ninth Circuit and remanded the action for further proceedings. 6,
C. Issue Presented
In the majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized the novel
question of law raised by this case in his opening sentence. He, along with the
majority, viewed the issue as whether the abduction of a criminal defendant to
the United States from a nation with which the U.S. maintains an extradition
treaty provides him a defense to the jurisdiction of United States' courts.62 The
Court noted that it had previously considered the issue of proceedings in alleged
violation of an Extradition Treaty, as well as the issue of a defendant brought by
forcible abduction to a court of law, but it had never before considered an issue
which related definitively to both.
54. The other indictments issued against Alvarez included: (a) conspiracy to commit violent acts in
furtherance of racketeering activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1959; (b) committing violent acts in
furtherance of racketeering activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(2); and (c) conspiracy to kidnap a
federal agent, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(5). Alvarez-Machain, 112 S.Ct. at 2190 n.l.
55. Extradition Treaty, supra note 37.
56. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S.Ct. at 2190.
57. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991) and subsequent history.
58. Id.
59. Apparently, the Mexican government directed certain letters to that of the United States which, in
the District Court and the Ninth Circuit, served as an "official protest" of the United States' violation of the
Extradition Treaty. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S.Ct. at 2191.
60. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d at 1350 (9th Cir. 1991). The Verdugo court, in this proceeding,
held the forcible abduction from Mexico by U.S. agents without the consent or acquiescence of the Mexican
government constitutes a violation of the Extradition Treaty. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466
(9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, on appeal, 112 S.Ct. 2188 (1992) (citing Verdugo, 939 F.2d at 1351-52).
61. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S.Ct. at 2191.
62. Id. at 2190.
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IV. UNITED KINGDOM'S HOUSE OF LORDS
A. Statement of Facts
Paul Bennett was a citizen of New Zealand who purchased a helicopter in
Great Britain in 1989 under what the House of Lords termed "a series of false
pretences. 63 Bennett had apparently financed his purchase through an English
company and defaulted on his payments. The English police traced him to South
Africa and sought to arrange for his presence in the United Kingdom for trial.
Since no extradition treaty existed between the United Kingdom and South
Africa, the English police considered utilizing Section 15 of the Extradition Act
which dealt with the method and procedures for extradition." However, the
police sought South Africa's assistance in abducting Bennett in order to deport
him to the English jurisdiction for trial.
Two South African detectives, acting under the coordinated efforts of the
English and South African police, arrested Bennett on January 28, 1991 in
Lanseria, South Africa to return him to the United Kingdom for prosecution. At
that time, he was to be repatriated to New Zealand through Taipei by plane, and
since an extradition treaty existed between England and New Zealand, Bennett's
return would allow for a direct extradition to the United Kingdom. Once his
plane reached Taipei however, he was forced to return to South Africa and held
in custody until mid-February, whereupon he was flown into Heathrow airport
and immediately taken into custody."
B. Statement of the Case
Bennett was brought for committal proceedings before the Horseferry Road
Magistrates' Court. He requested an "adjournment" to allow him to challenge
the court's jurisdiction because of his abduction, however, the Magistrate refused
and committed him for trial to the Southwark Crown Court on five counts of
"dishonesty." Bennett appealed the Magistrate's decision to the Queen's Bench
Divisional Court, and on July 22, 1992, that court accepted jurisdiction over the
issue of whether, in applicable appellate standards, the court could inquire into
the circumstances by which Bennett had been brought within the jurisdiction of
the court.6
The Queen's Bench found that English and South African police had
colluded to obtain Bennett's presence before the court, but also found that it had
no power to inquire into the circumstances by which he was brought into the
country to stand trial. It accordingly dismissed Bennett's appeal and subsequent
63. Ex parte Bennett [199313 All E.R. at141. The facts of this case are derived from the recant of Lord
Griffiths.
64. Extradition Act, supra note 48.
65. Apparently, the English officer involved, Sergeant Davies, had informed the South African police that
if Bennett was returned through London he would be arrested on arrival. Davies then claimed he was informed
by the South African police that Bennett was to be repatriated to New Zealand via Heathrow. Davies then
consulted the Crown Prosecution Service and they decided that the English police would arrest Bennett upon
arrival. Affidavit of Sgt. Davies, Ex parte Bennett [1993] 3 All E.R. 138, 142.
66. Ex parte Bennett [1993] 2 All E.R. at 476.
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application for judicial review, 67 but certified the question of its power to the
House of Lords seeking an official opinion. A majority of the House, in a
lengthy discussion of five Lords, allowed Bennett's appeal to the Queen's Bench
Crown Division for determination and adjudication of his abduction.
C. Issue Presented
In the disposition by the Queen's Bench, the court framed the issue for the
House of Lords in compliance with Section 1(2) of Great Britain's Administra-
tion of Justice Act of 196068 as:
Whether ... [a] Court has power to inquire into the circumstances by which a
person has been brought within the jurisdiction and if so what remedy is available
if any to prevent his trial where that person has been lawfully arrested within thejurisdiction for a crime committed within the jurisdiction.6,
This question dealt with the issue of whether the court should possess the ability
to refuse to try an accused, if it believes the means by which he was brought
before the court were illegal. This issue, at least according to Lord Griffiths,
was analogous to but did not exactly mirror that of Alvarez-Machain.
V. COMPARISON OF THE CASES
A. Issue and Rationale
At issue in Alvarez-Machain was whether a person who is forcibly abducted
from another country for prosecution in the United States can raise that
abduction as a defense to the court's jurisdiction. Similarly, the issue before the
House of Lords in Ex parte Bennett was whether a court, having jurisdiction
over an abducted person, may look into the means by which he was brought
before it and refuse to prosecute him because of those means. Both issues,
though apparently similar in nature, were decided differently, perhaps this was
due to a different interpretation of the issue presented. However, this difference
in opinion itself poses a larger question of international law, seeking to
determine the outward bounds of State power in a global community. By their
apparent differences in opinion as to the common issue, the courts failed to reach
a similar conclusion.
1. United States v. Alvarez-Machain
In considering the issue presented in Alvarez-Machain, the Court noted two
quite similar cases, United States v. Rauscher and Ker v. Illinois. Incidentally,
both opinions were decided on the same day and delivered by Justice Miller.
Both cases also dealt with the specific issues presented in Alvarez-Machain, but
67. The court, speaking through Woolf, L.J., stated, with particularity, "But the prosecution, being a
proper one, there being no abuse of the procedures and process of that prosecution, it seems to me that the
preliminary issue must be determined in the respondent's [State's] favour and, accordingly, as this preliminary
issue is decisive of the application, the application has to be dismissed." Ex parte Bennett, 2 All E.R. at 480.
68. The Administration of Justice Act of 1960 § 1, para. 2 (Eng.).
69. Ex parte Bennett, 2 All E.R. at 480.
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differed to such extent that neither could be binding without further consideration
of the facts of the case and the law applicable to the action at hand.
The Court in Rauscher had considered an alleged international treaty
violation. The United States and England executed the Webster-Ashburton
Treaty70 to govern extradition between the two nations. An Act of Congress
imposed certain provisions onto the treaty by implication, requiring the extradited
nationals be charged with only those crimes for which they were extradited. 71
Justice Miller recognized the fact that this restriction had been created by the
legislature, implied into the treaty, and thus became a term within the treaty. As
a result of implying the term upon the parties, the Court held that the treaty had
been violated.72 Though the facts of Rauscher are not necessary for an analysis
in Alvarez's case, Rauscher had been extradited under the law of a treaty
whereas no extradition was ever attempted with Alvarez. Thus, only the holding
that terms such as congressional enactments can become a part of a treaty by
implication was applicable to Alvarez's case.
The Court in Ker considered an alleged forcible abduction. Ker was
abducted from Lima, Peru after being convicted in Illinois for larceny. Though
the United States and Peru had established an extradition treaty, it was not
employed in securing Ker's presence in the country for trial. The Ker Court held
that its power to try a person for a crime was not impaired solely because the
defendant had been brought into the jurisdiction by means of forcible abduc-
tion.73 It further held that once a party is brought within the jurisdiction of the
court which has the right to try him, he has no reason to fail to answer for his
offense, even though he may have been brought into the jurisdiction by forcible
means.
74
However similar Ker and Alvarez-Machain may seem, the present Court dis-
tinguished the two by the private actions which occurred in Ker and the
governmental involvement in Alvarez-Machain. Thus, the Court held this "Ker
Doctrine" inapplicable until it determined the precise terms of the Extradition
Treaty as under Rauscher to see if there had been a violation. More particularly,
the Court stated, "the first inquiry must be whether the abduction of respondent
from Mexico violated the extradition treaty between the United States and
Mexico. If we conclude that the Treaty does not prohibit respondent's
abduction, the rule in Ker applies."7 Taking the Treaty into consideration, the
Court first analyzed its explicit meaning, looking at the terms therein.76
70. Webster-Ashburton Treaty, Aug. 9, 1842, U.S.-Eng., 8 Stat. 572, 576.
71. Specifically known as the Doctrine of Specialty, which Congress imposed upon all extradition treaties
through § 5275 of the Revised Statutes, enacted Mar. 3, 1869.
72. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 430. It is interesting to note the variance of opinion on this issue, as seen in
the opinion of Waithe, C.J., dissenting and holding the Doctrine of Specialty did not apply to the treaty nor
could any Act of Congress affect the treaty; and in the opinion of Gray, J., concurring but holding Acts of
Congress formed the only basis for decision. 119 U.S. at 436.
73. See Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, reh'g denied, 343 U.S. 937 (1952) (A later application of the
Ker rule).
74. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S.Ct. at 2192, (quoting Ker, 119 U.S. at 444).
75. Id. at 2193.
76. Id. (citing Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 397 (1985)).
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In the terms of the Extradition Treaty, the Court found no mention of
"forcible abduction" or "forced extradition." Alvarez claimed Article 22(1) of
the Treaty (scope of application) had been violated," and he alleged that it
provided for extradition as the only means by which one nation could bring to
justice the other's nationals. The Court noted-that an interpretation as alleged,
however, would require that extradition be the exclusive remedy for the
occurrence of all offenses listed by the Treaty. The "more natural conclusion"
to the Court was that Article 22(1) was designed to merely ensure that the Treaty
applied to requests after its date-in-force and regardless of the date of the
crime.78 After further review of the terms of the Treaty with no indication of
an express proscription of forcible abduction, the Court then began to analyze it
for any implicit terms generated through the nations' respective history and
practice.
Examining historical practice under the Treaty, the Court concluded that
forcible abduction had been held not to violate terms of the Extradition Treaty
in the past. In fact, the Court noted that the Mexican government had been
made aware of the United States' position on forcible abduction, as well as its
practice as to such acts, as early as 1906. In support of its conclusion, the Court
re-examined the 1905 Martfnez incident where a Mexican national was similarly
abducted from Mexico and brought to trial in the United States. There, as in the
Alvarez case, the Mexican government strongly protested the abduction and
wrote to the United States Secretary of State about what it considered to be a vi-
olation of the then existing Extradition Treaty.79  The Court nevertheless
interpreted Ker as allowing forcible abduction above the terms of the Treaty,
finding that the Treaty failed to restrict Ker's application, which then empowered
the Court to rule accordingly.80
Having concluded that the language and the usage of the Extradition Treaty
failed to prohibit forcible abduction, per se, the Court finally considered whether
the Treaty should be interpreted as including "an implied term prohibiting
prosecution where the defendant's presence is obtained by means other than
those established by the Treaty."'" Alvarez's main argument caused the
majority to briefly consider international custom. The Court recognized that it
had created a term by implication in the U.S.-England extradition treaty in
77. Extradition Treaty, supra note 37. Art. 22(1) of the Extradition Treaty states that it applies to
offenses specified in the previous Article 2. Article 2, which deals with extraditable offenses, refers in
paragraph I to wilful acts which fall within clauses of the Treaty's Appendix. Id. at 5062. First on the list
in the Appendix is murder. Id. at 5076.
78. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S.Ct. at 2193.
79. See id. at 2194, n.l 1 (citing PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES,
H.R. Doc. No. 1, 59th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, 1121 (1906)).
80. Note also the Court's review of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d at 1354,
where the Ninth Circuit stressed an 1881 statement of the U.S. Secretary of State to a Texas governor
concluding the extradition treaty at that time did not authorize abductions from Mexico for which the U.S.
received no consent. The Circuit Court uses this statement to show that practice under the Extradition Treaty
does not authorize forcible abductions. The Supreme Court quickly notes the Circuit Court has "missed the
mark" since it is not looking at whether abduction is authorized under the Treaty, but whether it is prohibited.
This Court held it is not prohibited in general. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S.Ct. at 2194.
81. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S.Ct. at 2195.
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Rauscher in 1886;82 but it also noted the term had been created by implication
because of the similar "practice by nations with regard to extradition treaties" 3
during that period.
In Rauscher's case, the implied term, the "Doctrine of Specialty," was a
widely accepted part of custom and practice by most nations at that time. This
factor, coupled with our legislature's enactment of law and the Court's ability to
recognize such terms in treaties, persuaded that Court to take a small inferential
step and interject the term by implication into the treaty. In Alvarez's situation
however, the Court believed that such a small step would become more of an
"inferential leap" since Alvarez had presented only the most general of
international principles to support his argument that the Extradition Treaty,
through international practice, implicitly prohibited forcible abduction." Thus,
the Court saw no reason to create the term by implication and concluded
Alvarez's capture did not violate the Treaty and that the Ker Doctrine could be
applied.
2. R. v. Horseferry Road Magistrates' Court, ex parte Bennett
In examining the issue presented in Ex parte Bennett, the Queen's Bench
Divisional Court first considered Bennett's basis for judicial review. In R. v.
Crown Court at Manchester, ex parte DPP,5 the Queen's Bench had held that
one may bring an application for judicial review if moving to quash an
indictment for lack of jurisdiction. Bennett was moving to quash such an
indictment and thereby obtained such a right of appeal.
The Court next considered whether it could refuse to hear a case in which
the defendant was brought into the jurisdiction by improper means. In doing so,
the Court noted the decision in R. v. Plymouth Magistrate's Court, Ex parte
Driver,86 which held that for the purpose of refusing to try someone, "there is
no power in a court to inquire into the circumstances in which a person is found
in the jurisdiction .. . ,,.T Though in Bennett's case, Lord Justice Woolf s8
expressed his belief that a significant abuse of process might be grounds for such
a refusal,89 it is clear that the remainder of his decision stemmed from the Ex
parte Driver rationale which precluded the Court from determining that issue.
In its conclusion, the court found it had no authority to consider the issue of
abusive process with Bennett, since no abusive process occurred at trial. Under
the principle set forth by the Ex parte Driver court, the Queen's Bench dismissed
Bennett's application for review and denied him leave to appeal to the House of
82. Webster-Ashburton Treaty, supra note 70.
83. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S.CL at 2195-96.
84. Id. at 2196.
85. Ex pare Bennett [1993] 2 All E.R. at 477 (citing R. v. Crown Court at Manchester, ex parte DPP
[1993] 1 All E.R. 801).
86. R. v. Plymouth Magistrates' Court, ex parte Driver [1985] 2 All E.R. 681, [1986] Q.B. 95, [1985]
3 W.L.R. 689.
87. Er parte Bennett [1993] 2 All E.R. at 478, (quoting Ex parte Driver, 2 All E.R. at 697).
88. Both Woolf, U., and Pill, J., heard and decided the case at the Queen's Bench Divisional Court
level.
89. Ex Parte Bennett [1993] 2 All E.R. at 479.
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Lords. However, the court did frame a certified question for the consideration
of the House itself.
On certification, Lord Griffiths 9° quickly identified the rationale of the
Queen's Bench decision, citing the traditional English common law viewpoint
demonstrated by Ex parte Driver. He noted this long-standing law which was
considered and cited by the Queen's Bench in its decision - cases consistent
with and cited by the Ex parte Driver court: Ex Parte Susannah Scott, Sinclair
v. HM Advocate,9' and Rex v. Officer Commanding Depot Battalion, RASC,
Colchester, ex parte Elliott.92 Each of these decisions concluded, as does Ex
parte Driver, that the court possessed only a limited ability to investigate the
means by which a person is brought within its jurisdiction in an "abuse of
process" situation.93 Each of these cases also examined the traditional common
law rule that refuses the court such power to inquire. In Lord Griffiths'
judgment, he not only represented a need to expand this judicial discretion, but
he, along with Lords Bridge of Hartwick and Lowry, also shed some light on
relevant English case law contrary to the Ex pane Driver decision, as well as
that of the international community.
The first of these English cases is R. v. Bow Street Magistrates, ex parte
Mackeson,9 considered by the Queen's Bench in proceedings below but
rejected nonetheless. Mackeson, a British citizen living outside of the country,
was forcibly abducted from Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and arrested at Gatwick in
1980. He applied for an order to prohibit committal proceedings against him in
the Magistrate's Court on his charges. The Queen's Bench issued that order
after much deliberation and careful consideration of precedent from the New
Zealand Court of Appeals.
Lord Lane, C.J., of the Ex parte Mackeson court first held the court had
jurisdiction to try Mackeson, and in a bold statement demonstrative of the
traditional power of the court over the person, he stated:
90. Four other Lords joined Lord Griffiths in the opinion. The concurring members were Lord Bridge
of Harwick, Lord Slynn of Hadley and Lord Lowry. Lord Oliver of Aylmerton was the sole dissenter.
91. Sinclair v. HM Advocate (1890) 17 R(J) 39.
92. R. v. Officer Commanding Depot Battalion, RASC, Colchester, ex parte Elliott [1949] 1 All E.R. 373.
93. Lords Griffiths and Lowry addressed the issue of defining the phrase "abuse of process." Lowry
described it as the "abuse of the process of the court which is to try the accused," and also "a misuse or
improper manipulation of the process of the court" (citation omitted). Ex parre Bennett [1993] 3 All E.R. at
160. He also describes a situation in which the court's process has been abused as allowing acts which provide
morally unacceptable foundations for the exercise of jurisdiction over the suspect and taint the proposed trial.
Id. at 162.
Griffiths quoted from Reg. v. Derby Crown Court, ex parte Brooks (1984) 80 Cr. App. R. 164, 168-69,
to define circumstances in which the court may "stop a prosecution." Ex parte Bennett [1993] 3 All E.R. at
149-50. The Ex pane Brooks court defined an abuse of process as occurring either (a) when the prosecution
manipulates or misuses the court's processes so as to deprive the defendant of protection provided by the law,
or (b) when the defendant most probably has been or will be prejudiced in the preparation of conduct of his
defense by the prosecution's unjustifiable delay. Ex parte Bennett [1993] 3 All E.R. at 149-50 (citing Expane
Brooks). In a more recent decision, Griffiths noted the court in Reg. v. Croydon Justices, ex parte Dean
(unreported) 19 February 1993, determined an abuse of process occurs when the executive takes some unlawful
action with respect to the accused. Er parte Bennett [1993] 3 All E.R. at 150 (citing Ex pare Dean).
94. R. v. Bow Street Magistrates, ex parte Mackeson (1981) 75 Cr. App. R. 24.
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Whatever the reason for the applicant being at Gatwick Airport on the tarmac,
whether his arrival there had been obtained by fraud or illegal means, he was there.
He was subject to arrest by the police force of this country. Consequently, the
mere fact that his arrival there may have been procured by illegality did not in any
way oust the jurisdiction of the court. 9 (emphasis added).
For a moment, this statement appears to mirror the reasoning behind the Alvarez-
Machain Court. However, Lane's ultimate conclusions regarding Mackeson's
abduction run somewhat contrary to this bold statement.
For the basis of his judgment, Lane turned to the judgment of Woodhouse,
J. in Reg v. Hartley, from the New Zealand Court of Appeal, whose facts are
similar to those of Mackeson and Bennett." In Woodhouse's opinion, he
recognized that extradition procedures stemming from treaties between nations
are well-known and explicitly enumerated in statutes. He proclaimed that it is
for the protection of the public that such statutes "demand the sanction of
recognised court processes before any person ... can properly be surrendered
from one country to another."'97 This concept is basic to a free society, he
continued, and the means by which Hartley's trial was made possible varied so
greatly with the statutory requirements and conflicted so greatly with "one of the
most important principles of the rule of law" that the court should refuse to hear
the case and discharge Hartley.9" Lane also held accordingly and ordered pro-
hibition against the Magistrate's Court to discharge Mackeson.
Lords Griffiths, Bridge, Lowry and Slynn, sought to uphold the holdings
of Hartley and Ex parte Mackeson in their separate opinions. Comparing case
law and the Queen's Bench decision, Griffiths distinguished Ex parte Mackeson
from Ex parte Driver. Noting first that Mackeson was decided in 1981 and
followed by a subsequent 1983 Divisional Court ruling in Reg. v. Guildford
Magistrates' Court, ex parte Healy," Griffiths considered the Ex parte Driver
court in 1985 to be of a different composition than the Mackeson court, a
possible reason why the same issue was decided in an opposing manner.
Though the latter court had in essence changed its position since deciding Ex
parte Driver, Griffiths did not believe this would necessarily prevent it from
deciding along the lines of the later Ex parte Mackeson decision. It was for this
purpose that Griffiths and Bridge introduced more persuasive common law
regarding abduction from courts of the international community.
The decision of the South African Court of Appeal in S. v. Ebrahim'0
was persuasively cited as authority by both Lords. Ebrahim, a former citizen of
South Africa, was abducted from his home in Swaziland by persons under South
African authority. He was returned to South Africa under charges of treason,
then tried and sentenced to a 20-year prison term. His application for dismissal
on grounds of his abduction in violation of international law was rejected by the
trial court, but on appeal of the dismissal ruling, the Court of Appeal ruled that
95. Ex parte Bennett [1993] 3 All E.R. at 143 (quoting Ex parte Mackeson, 75 Cr. App. R. 32).
96. Reg. v. Hartley, [1978] 2 N.Z.L.R. 199.
97. ld. at 216-17.
98. Id.
99. Reg. v. Guildford Magistrates' Court, ex parte Healy [1983] 1 W.L.R. 108.
100. S. v. Ebrahim, 1991 (2) S.A. 553.
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his abduction was a "serious injustice." It also found that the court before which
he had been brought lacked any jurisdiction to try him,' 0' and in a striking
statement, the court held that the rules regarding the injustice of forcible
abduction embodied:
several fundamental legal principles, viz, those that maintained and promoted human
rights, good relations between states and the sound administration of justice: the
individual had to be protected against unlawful detention and against abduction, the
limits of territorial jurisdiction and the sovereignty of states had to be respected, the
fairness of the legal process guaranteed and the abuse thereof prevented so as to
protect and promote the dignity and integrity of the judicial system. 2
The international principle of law handed down by the Court of Appeal is but
one basis upon which the Lords concluded their opinions. Insight from other
nations in the international community regarding the problem of forcible abduc-
tion was also considered.
Lord Bridge considered the United States' decision in Toscanino and the
dissenting opinion of Alvarez-Machain. In Toscanino, an Italian citizen,
convicted in a New York District Court for drug conspiracy, was subsequently
kidnapped in Uruguay and brought to the United States for prosecution. Though
he alleged the court had acquired jurisdiction unlawfully, the District Court
applied the Ker Doctrine and stated that allegations of "unlawful means" were
immaterial to its exercise of jurisdiction since Toscanino was physically present
at the time of trial. 03
On appeal, the Second Circuit made a stand against the rationale of both
Ker and Frisbie and held that in a forced abduction situation, the government
should be denied the right to exploit its own illegal conduct. Lord Bridge noted
that the decision more forcefully established that any power the court acquired
from this unlawful conduct was equivalent to "the fruits of the government's ex-
ploitation of its own misconduct." 104 This opinion, coupled with Ebrahim and
the strong dissent in Alvarez-Machain10 5 created the general framework of the
Lords' opinion, holding that in all fairness, a court must have power to inquire
into the means by which a defendant is subjected to process within its
jurisdiction. He noted this was important, both for the protection of nationals
and their fundamental human rights but also for the advancement and promotion
of international relations and international law.
The second consideration made by the Lords was that of broadening the
court's discretion. To achieve this goal, Lords Griffiths, Bridge and Lowry all
suggested empowering the court with the ability to investigate the means by
which an accused is brought before it. From such evidence, a court could then
refuse to hear the case because of such improper acts. Griffiths agreed, noting
that the High Court should ensure executive action be exercised responsibly and
101. Ex parte Bennett [19931 3 All E.R. at 153.
102. Id. (citing Ebrahim, 1991 (2) S.A. 553).
103. Ex parte Bennett [1993] 3 All E.R. at 154 (citing Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 268).
104. Id.
105. Id. For a discussion of the dissenting opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Blackmun, J.J., and O'Connor,
JJ.., in Alvarez-Machwin, 112 S.Ct. at 2197, see infra part V.B.I.
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as intended by the parliament, and if the High Court finds a serious abuse of
power, it should express disapproval by refusing to act upon it.'06
Lowry also agreed with this addition of power and, referring to the authority
cited by Lord Bridge, reasoned that the court had a duty to protect its own
process from degradation and misuse. He believed that the court must therefore
be able to stay proceedings made possible only by acts which "offend the court's
conscience as . .. contrary to the rule of law."' 7 Bridge offered his personal
opinions on the certified question and prosecution at hand:
There is, I think, no principle more basic to any proper system of law than the
maintenance of the rule of law itself.... To hold that the court may turn a blind
eye to executive lawlessness beyond the frontiers of its own jurisdiction is, in my
mind, an insular and unacceptable view.... (I]f the authorities, instead of
proceeding by way of extradition, have resorted to abduction, that is the effective
commencement of the prosecution process and is the illegal foundation on which
it rests.... To hold that in these circumstances the court may decline to exercise
its jurisdiction... is, in my view, a wholly proper and necessary one."
Because a majority of Lords believed the judiciary should be responsible for
maintaining and overseeing executive action, they held it should have the power
to refuse to condone executive behavior that threatens fundamental human rights
or the rule of law.' 9 They further held that since the court should not declare
itself powerless and stand idly by as the executive manipulates its processes as
with Bennett. Rather, the court should act to display its disapproval for such
action by refusing to hear the case."' The majority thus chose to extend the
court's power, noting strong disapproval for Bennett's abduction.
B. Dissenting Opinions
1. United States v. Alvarez-Machain
The Alvarez-Machain Court produced a vigorous dissent. The majority
opinion led by the Chief Justice and joined by Justices White, Scalia, Kennedy,
Souter and Thomas was strongly opposed by Justices Stevens, Blackmun, and
O'Connor. The central theme of their dissent invoked internationally accepted
principles of law, and though they agreed with the majority that the case raised
a question of first impression, they quickly concluded that the United States' acts
violated Mexico's territorial integrity."'
The dissenting opinion found that the actions taken by the United States
government to forcibly abduct Alvarez violated the Extradition Treaty established
between the United States and Mexico. Reaching this conclusion, the minority
106. Ex parte Bennett [1993] 3 All E.R. at 152.
107. Id. at 162.
108. Id. at 155-56.
109. Id. at 150.
110. Id. Consequently, once Bennett was back before the Queen's Bench Division, that court quashed
both the committal charges against him as well as the order of the Magistrate's Court committing him for trial
because of the unlawful means by which he was brought into the United Kingdom. See Propriety of Procedure
if Paramount; Law Report, TIMES OF LONDON, Apr. 1, 1994. See also the application of Er parte Bennett in
In re Schmidt in Extradition jurisdiction limited by Act; Law Report, TIMES OF LONDON, July 1, 1994.
111. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S.Ct. at 2197.
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discussed the goal of the Treaty and the fact that it was an 'all-inclusive'
document for which strict application was required. They also discussed the fact
that if such acts were permissible, the Treaty would serve no purpose and have
no reason for existence. Taking Alvarez's position, the dissenters concluded that
the Treaty was intended to require extradition as the only means to obtain a
perpetrator for prosecution when any act listed therein occurred." 2 This, they
reasoned, not only would preserve respect for territorial integrity, but would also
end the impermissible practice of self-help that sovereign States employ and
which violates territorial integrity.
The dissent also found the United States' acts went against internationally
accepted principles of law. Reciting Oppenheim, they quoted the following
principle: "A State must not perform acts of sovereignty in the territory of
another State .... It is . . . a breach of International Law for a State to sendits
agents to the territory of another State to apprehend persons accused of having
committed a crime.""' 3 They continued by quoting the opinion of Justice Story
in The Appollon,"4 a case factually similar to Alvarez-Machain, in which he
held that such abductions performed without the consent of the foreign
government constitute a gross violation of international law. Finally, using the
Restatement of Foreign Relations, the dissent noted that section 432 prohibits
law enforcement officers of one State from exercising their functions within the
territory of another, without the latter's consent." 5 From these principles, the
dissent concluded that the government's acts in Alvarez' case violated such
principles of international law.
The basis of the dissent was the majority's alleged failure to differentiate
private conduct from acts of the government. This, the dissenters noted that this
was the "critical flaw" of the majority opinion." 6 Justice Stevens began the
argument by comparing private conduct to official conduct. According to
Stevens, the conduct of private citizens did not violate treaty obligations, as
exemplified by Ker. However, he noted that when the conduct is authorized by
the government, an unquestionable violation of international law then arises." 7
Thus, the government's actions in abducting Alvarez constituted a direct breach
of the underlying obligations of the Extradition Treaty.
The dissenters then turned to Cook v. United States,"8 for which Justice
Brandeis wrote the opinion. The Court in Cook held that an act performed by
federal officers which exceeds. the authority conferred by a treaty is unlawful
because treaties are intended to "fix the conditions under which ... [a
government may take action to bring about] adjudication in accordance with the
[United States'] applicable laws."" 9 The dissenters agreed with Alvarez that
112. Id. at 2198.
113. Id. at 2202 (quoting 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW § 295 & n.1).
114. The Appollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 370-71 (1824).
115. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S.Ct. at 2202 n.23 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 432
& cmt. c).
116. Id. at 2203.
117. Id.
118. Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933).
119. 1& at 120-22.
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the Extradition Treaty between the United States and Mexico fixed the conditions
by which the United States could have obtained Alvarez's presence in court.
They attributed the majority's erroneous decision to the Justices' failure to
understand the difference between governmental and private action.
2. R. v. Horseferry Road Magistrates' Court, ex parte Bennett
Of the five Lords whose judgments were announced in Ex parte Bennett,
only one dissented from the majority. Lord Oliver of Aylmerton stood alone in
his opinion of the change the Lords were committing to the courts of the United
Kingdom.
In his dissent, Lord Oliver restated the issue presented to the House as
whether the court "should assume the duty of overseeing, controlling and
punishing an abuse of executive power leading up to properly instituted criminal
proceedings.., by restraining the further prosecution of those proceedings."'"0
He declared that the addition of this power would greatly affect public policy in
a number of ways. First, properly charged persons (if guilty) would be allowed
to go unpunished. Second, enforceable remedies would still be available to those
persons charged. Third, public interest in prosecution and punishment of crime,
in general, would be defeated by a mere showing of judicial disapproval.'
To Lord Oliver, these reasons were sufficient to restrain the courts' assumption
of such power.
The basis of Oliver's dissent was directed to a careful differentiation of the
precedent cited by the majority. He claimed that a distinction had to be made
between the civil and criminal case law cited by the others, since the English
courts in civil cases had always possessed the power to ensure that their
processes were not abused by their ability to release those unlawfully obtained.
This power in a civil matter had never been doubted, but Oliver also noted that
the United Kingdom had traditionally treated criminal cases in a different
manner.
To support his conclusion, Oliver noted that until Ex parte Mackeson in
1981, an unbroken line of authority existed in the United Kingdom; in criminal
cases, once a person was in lawful custody in the country, the court was
powerless to inquire into the means by which he may have been brought before
it." This principle, Oliver claims, was followed by the Ex parte Driver court
in 1986, which rejected a decision to the contrary in Ex parte Mackeson, and
followed the more traditional approach. This, in turn, was followed by the lower
court in Bennett's case.
The case at hand raised a novel question of law to the court. It invited the
House of Lords to expand the court's power in criminal matters to embrace a
much wider jurisdiction, extending even to the "administration of justice."'2
Lord Oliver insisted however, that this expansion was unwarranted and would
only yield inconvenience and uncertainty. In support, he posed two questions.
120. Exparte Bennett [1993] 3 All E.R. at 156.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 157.
123. Id.
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First, he asked whether the court should have this duty or any power to
investigate and oversee executive abuses made prior to criminal proceedings.
Second, if no such power is found, he questioned whether a court should have
that power if a person is brought before the court as a result of unlawful activity
within the jurisdiction where he was obtained.
To answer his initial question, Oliver pointed out that no precedent existed
allowing for such a broadening of the power of the court. Though he agreed that
the court must have some power to investigate bona fide charges of "bad faith"
actions, he reasoned that where the party does not suggest bad faith or unfairness
during the trial process, the court can maintain no grounds upon which to inquire
and claim discretion.'" Oliver then offered an observation by Lord Scarman
in Reg. v. Sangt25 to support this principle. Scarman had stated, "Judges are
not responsible for the bringing or abandonment of prosecutions; nor have. they
the right to adjudicate in a way which indirectly usurps the functions of the
legislature or jury."'" Thus, Oliver believed the majority was exerting
excessive power.
To answer his second question, Lord Oliver posed two possibilities by
which the court could acquire this power. First, he believed one could argue that
in consideration of international comity, English courts should use some
discretion to disapprove invasion of sovereign territorial rights of foreign States
in the context of abduction. However, he also noted that criminal courts should
not be concerned with determining what exactly constitutes a violation of foreign
law occurring on foreign soil, and that this power should be left solely to
diplomatic discussions between governments.2 7 Secondly, Oliver noted that
the court might believe a "right" exists under the Extradition Act if a person is
wrongfully detained and deported to the United Kingdom. However, he also
noted that the Extradition Act was never used in Bennett's case, and the arrest
and detention were not a part of the trial process. Therefore, Oliver believed any
actions used to secure Bennett's presence before the Magistrates' Court went
beyond the scope of the court's inquiry, and he saw no reason why the court
should have this power conferred upon it, whatever outrage the questionable acts
may cause.
VI. A NEW, EMERGING WORLD ORDER
The views of these two courts differ in reasoning and interpretation of the
basic situation at hand. The Alvarez-Machain Court viewed international forced
extradition as raising a question of domestic law regarding the outward limits of
State sovereignty and the restrictions questionably placed upon that sovereignty
by the Extradition Treaty and other international considerations. The Court there
chose to ignore the means by which the abducted person was brought before the
court. However, in Ex parte Bennett, the Lords viewed international forced
extradition as raising only a question of whether traditional English law should
124. Id. at 158.
125. Reg. v. Sang [1980] AC 402.
126. Er parte Bennett [1993] 3 All E.R. at 158 (quoting Sang A.C. at 454).
127. Id. at 159.
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give way to more contemporary considerations of international relations and
transnational consequences. There, the House of Lords chose not to ignore the
means by which the abducted person was brought before the court. Both
opinions form one example of a struggle the nations of the world now face
between maintaining traditional views of State sovereignty and acknowledging
that since the Cold War's conclusion, a newer and more encompassing world
order is slowly coming to life.
The Alvarez-Machain decision embodies the view that traditional concepts
of State sovereignty must be maintained. It reaffirms the concept of States as
powerful, autonomous sovereigns which dictate law according to their own
desires and principles, but also according to self-granted authority, regardless of
the international consequences which may ensue. This view clearly established
the foundation for the nineteenth century decisions relied upon by the Court and
also those handed down by the courts of Germany and the United Kingdom until
now.'28 It is a view that has been held in great esteem by nations institutional-
ly, since the conception of national boundaries, but one being gradually
superseded by a more progressive recognition of the State as a smaller unit of
an international community.
On the other hand, the Ex parte Bennett decision is diametrically opposed
to Alvarez-Machain. It represents a progressive view of the State as sovereign
but enmeshed with other States to form a more cohesive and restrictive interna-
tional union. Under this model, State law remains important because the State
itself remains sovereign and self-governing. However, recognition by the State
of the existence of a higher law created through the international community has
now become equally as important. This latter principle has brought about the
recognition of a "new world order" which seeks to limit the traditional concept
of States as exclusive entities and promote this concept of States acting in a
collective unit within the community. Such a principle certainly calls for
diminution of State sovereignty, but the concept of sovereignty as a whole
cannot be lost.
At this time, the holding in Alvarez-Machain is not necessarily incorrect,
nor is the decision in Ex parte Bennett universally accepted. The conflicting
opinions demonstrated in and by these two cases are a product of the current
dispute regarding the extent to which State sovereignty trumps the law among
nations, and at what point it intrudes into the realm of the international
community. In his Report to the Security Council, An Agenda for Peace,29
U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali identified the fact that States are
becoming more internationally involved; governments are responding to the
outcry for democratic change; and the Cold War, a barrier once halting
international growth, has ended. 3° As a result, the United Nations, as a
collective unit of international strength, has been allowed to grow and act in
128. The Alvarez-Machain Decision Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Const. Rights of the House
Judiciary Comm. (July 24, 1992), in DEP'T ST. BuLL., Aug. 1992, at 615 (statement of Alan Kreczko).
129. BouTRos BOUTROS-GHALI, AN AGENDA FOR PEACE, PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY, PEACEMAKING AND
PEACEKEEPING, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting
of the Security Council on Jan. 1992, 46, U.N. Doc. S/24111 (1992), 31 I.L.M. 956, 17 (1992).
130. Id. at 957.
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ways which were previously impossible due to the superpower rivalry within the
Security Council.' 3 ' Thus, the United Nations has been catapulted into a more
prominent role in addressing the world's post Cold War problems.
This tremendous growth in power and ability has expanded the State's role
as a community member and simultaneously restricted, to some extent, traditional
views of unincumbered State sovereignty. This, in turn, has brought about a
greater recognition of State responsibility in the relationships between the smaller
units, which has been readily accepted in countries like the United Kingdom and
its House of Lords. However, it has not been received so graciously by others,
including the United States Supreme Court, and this may pose a problem for the
future growth of the international community. However large this world order
may grow, the State remains important. It still continues to be the foundation
for such a community, and "the respect for its fundamental sovereignty and
integrity are [sic] crucial to any common international progress.' 32  The
distinction however, between State sovereignty and international responsibility
has been left unresolved by these decisions, and the opposing viewpoints they
set forth frustrate the progress of the international community even further.
It is only by mere speculation that one could possibly predict the effect
these decisions may have upon the growth and progress of the international
community. What the United States may view as a mere affirmation of
jurisdictional principles may appear to other States as a newly established
executive authority to conduct international abductions.' 33 Surely our Supreme
Court did not intend to grant such authority, but this viewpoint is not unreason-
able, especially for those nations who officially denounced the decision or issued
declarations after it was rendered.13' For a decision that sought to merely
reaffirm a key principle of law, it appeared to the rest of the world as a "green
light" to violate principles of international law. It also wrongfully created the
appearance of an accepted governmental practice which not only compelled
President Bush to assure Mexican President Salinas that similar actions would
not be conducted, encouraged or condoned, 35 but also brought into the
forefront the proposition of amending the Extradition Treaty expressly to exclude
such activity. 36
131. Id. at 958.
132. Id. at 959.
133. Kreczko, supra note 128, at 614.
134. See id. at 615-17. Among the Caribbean nations officially protesting the Supreme Court's decision
were: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Jamaica, Mexico, Paraguay, and Uruguay. The Court's
decision was also closely followed by the European and Mexican press, including Agence France Press and
Le Monde (Fr.), La Opini6n and El Pregonero (Mex.), La Stampa (It.), Der Standard (Ger.), NRC Handelsblad
and Trouw (Hol.).
135. Id. at 618. In fact, the controversy survived the Bush presidency and confronted the Clinton
administration when Mexican officials urged Mr. Clinton to issue an executive order to prohibit transborder
kidnapping. See Gail Diane Cox, Drug War's Big Showcase Falls Apart, NAT'L. L.J., Feb. 1, 1993, at 8. See
also Jim Newton, Clinton Urged to Ban Foreigners' Abductions, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1993, at Metro 3 (Mr.
Clinton's denouncement of the Alvarez-Machain kidnapping).
136. Strong consideration has been given to a proposed amendment to the existing Extradition Treaty
between the United States and Mexico which would expressly proscribe "transborder applications of law."
Relations Between the U.S. and Mexico, SAN Dmoo UNION-TRiB., Feb. 27, 1994, at G-5. This amendment
of course, has been urged by Mexico. Id.
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Alternatively, the potential outcomes that may ensue decisions like Ex parte
Bennett are largely predictable and more accepted within the international
community of States. Yielding some State power for the promotion of
international principles and objectives benefits the international community of
States, and the reluctance of States to promote international wrongdoing, i.e.
international forced extradition, helps reinforce the transnational respect which
the United Nations and its Charter seek to accomplish. Clearly, decisions which
follow the Ex parte Bennett rationale would receive little criticism from the
international community."7
When the Charter was signed, almost fifty years ago, the nations which
consented to its terms and conditions never expected a Cold War to dampen the
effectiveness of its underlying organization as a whole. Perhaps they never
expected to see such an empowerment of the organization as well, but the
founding States did recognize a need to be fulfilled by a world order of united
nations. This organization would serve as a means by which the countries of the
world could unite their strength in the maintenance of peace, the promotion of
economic and social advancement, and the preservation and protection of the
fundamental rights of humankind. The extent of the organization's actual powers
could not have been anticipated in 1945, but each Member State, upon accession
thereto, recognized that it was exchanging a portion of its sovereignty for the
greater good. The problem the nations of the world now face is whether they
will yield that portion for the enhancement of a collective, international world
order.
VII. CONCLUSION
From the concept of separate States with independent autonomy and
prerogatives to that of a community of inter dependent States, the peoples of the
world have changed - regrouped - modified. They are no longer just a part
of States but now a part of the-international community. Because of the growth
of -power and recognition this new, collective world unity has accumulated,
States are now faced with adaptation and modification toward a newly-
recognized concept of international responsibility, inherently differing from the
fundamental principles upon which those nations were founded. This change is
all a part of a larger goal, which involves a new world order - one in which
States are not independent of each other, but interdependent and reliant upon
each other for the good of humankind and the preservation of peace.
The problem the international community now faces is the reluctance of
some States to submit fully to the concept of an international society. Of course
this is an expected and justifiable position for any State to take, for if it submits,
it must yield a portion of the sovereignty inherent in its history and forming the
foundation from which it evolved. Likewise, if the State resists, it may further
delay the fruits that such concession may yield. There exists a distinct and fine
line between the choices.
137. Consider Andrew L.-T. Choo, Ex Parte Bennett: The Demise of the Male Captus, Bene Detentus
Doctrine in England, 5 CRim. L.F. 165 (1994) (book review).
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Mr. Bennett and Dr. Alvarez are but two players in a large arena; a
community of world nations are participants as well and are charged with the
responsibility to make decisions which may reshape and reorder that arena.
Ironically, both Bennett and Alvarez are the bearers of the problem we now face
and have brought it to the forefront of international attention. This has shown
the nations of the world the paths now becoming clear. Either path determines
and shapes what exactly will constitute this world order in generations to come,
and it is now up to those nations to choose.
David H. Herrold
